AAEP-05 aircraft tolerance to portable electronic devices

What it is

AAEP-05, Demonstrating Aircraft E3 Tolerance to Portable Electronic Devices, is a NATO Allied Aircraft Electrical and Electromagnetic Considerations Publication. It sets out an agreed way to demonstrate that a military aircraft tolerates portable electronic devices, PEDs, carried and used by passengers and crew, without those devices interfering with the aircraft's own electrical and electronic systems. It covers both transmitting devices (T-PEDs, such as a phone or tablet on cellular, WiFi or Bluetooth) and non-transmitting devices, and it treats active RFID tags as T-PEDs for this purpose. Nations record their agreement to use the publication in STANAG 7230, and Edition A, Version 1 has been in effect since it was promulgated in May 2021.

It builds on civil aviation guidance rather than writing its own

AAEP-05 does not define new EMC test methods. It directs participating nations to the civil aviation industry's own material, RTCA/DO-307 and RTCA/DO-294C, and their EUROCAE counterparts ED-118 and ED-130, and asks that Analysis and Test Procedures be built on those "with accommodations as necessary to address military specific PEDs, aircraft and equipment". The document is explicit that military PEDs can sit outside commercial frequency or power norms, so the civil material is a starting point rather than something applied unread.

Two ways a device can interfere

The document separates PED emissions into two mechanisms: unintentional, or spurious, emissions that are a by-product of a device's own electronics, and intentional emissions radiated deliberately by a transmitting device's antenna. A non-transmitting PED only produces the first kind; a transmitting PED or an active RFID tag produces both. Each mechanism is assessed along its own path into aircraft receivers and equipment, using the evaluation approach the referenced civil documents set out for it.

The clearance process itself

The operative chapters set a general process that has to address every phase of flight, working out which interference paths are credible enough to need assessment. A National E3 Airworthiness Technical Authority can approve an alternate assessment procedure, provided it stays compatible with the referenced civil guidance, and existing evidence can sometimes be reused rather than re-generated: type certification data evaluated against FAA or EASA HIRF regulation, or test data evaluated against AECTP-500 or a national equivalent, can support a T-PED tolerance assessment. The result of the assessment is one of three outcomes: the risk is negligible and needs no action, it is manageable and gets documented and mitigated, or it is judged significant and unmanageable, in which case the document requires the prohibition to be documented. Where a restriction does apply, it goes into the Aircraft Flight Manual or Operating Instructions, not into a separate compliance record.

RFID, reporting and training sit alongside the main process

A dedicated section addresses Radio Frequency Identification devices: frequency assignments have to stay outside aviation bands, and active or battery-assisted-passive RFID devices are treated as transmitting PEDs rather than as a class of their own. Another section sets out what an in-flight interference report should capture: the flight details, a description of the effect observed, what the crew did in response, and identification of the suspected device. And the document requires training: aircrew on the PED restrictions that apply to the aircraft they fly, cabin crew and anyone else using a PED on board on the interference aspects specific to that device and aircraft.

Design-time and in-service both apply

The document gives two routes into the same outcome. For a new aircraft type, or a major modification to one, the RTCA/DO-307 design and certification route applies, and its recommendations "closely follow existing practices for aircraft system High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) protection". For a fleet that is already flying, allowing a new class of T-PED technology runs through the RTCA/DO-294C route instead, which evaluates the existing aircraft's immunity rather than its design. An operator responsible for a fleet may document one evaluation covering the whole fleet, unless significant variation within it calls for a separate assessment.

What AAEP-05 does not cover

The document is explicit about its own boundary. Concerns specific to weapons safety, such as hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance and electro-explosive device safety margins, along with emission security and control, are placed "beyond the scope of this document" and are addressed elsewhere. Interference to terrestrial communication networks and spectrum licensing is likewise outside its scope. And no organisation is certified against AAEP-05: what a National (E3) Airworthiness Technical Authority grants is a Technical Airworthiness Clearance for a specific aircraft type or fleet, not a certificate held by a company.

Standards it references

• AECTP-500Background