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AAEP-05
National technical airworthiness authorities and the operators responsible for clearing PEDs on a military aircraft fleet
AAEP-05 sets out how NATO nations demonstrate that a military aircraft tolerates portable electronic devices, transmitting or not, before a national airworthiness authority clears their use.
AAEP-05, Demonstrating Aircraft E3 Tolerance to Portable Electronic Devices, is a NATO Allied Aircraft Electrical and Electromagnetic Considerations Publication. It sets out an agreed way to demonstrate that a military aircraft tolerates portable electronic devices, PEDs, carried and used by passengers and crew, without those devices interfering with the aircraft's own electrical and electronic systems. It covers both transmitting devices (T-PEDs, such as a phone or tablet on cellular, WiFi or Bluetooth) and non-transmitting devices, and it treats active RFID tags as T-PEDs for this purpose. Nations record their agreement to use the publication in STANAG 7230, and Edition A, Version 1 has been in effect since it was promulgated in May 2021.
AAEP-05 does not define new EMC test methods. It directs participating nations to the civil aviation industry's own material, RTCA/DO-307 and RTCA/DO-294C, and their EUROCAE counterparts ED-118 and ED-130, and asks that Analysis and Test Procedures be built on those "with accommodations as necessary to address military specific PEDs, aircraft and equipment". The document is explicit that military PEDs can sit outside commercial frequency or power norms, so the civil material is a starting point rather than something applied unread.
The document separates PED emissions into two mechanisms: unintentional, or spurious, emissions that are a by-product of a device's own electronics, and intentional emissions radiated deliberately by a transmitting device's antenna. A non-transmitting PED only produces the first kind; a transmitting PED or an active RFID tag produces both. Each mechanism is assessed along its own path into aircraft receivers and equipment, using the evaluation approach the referenced civil documents set out for it.
The operative chapters set a general process that has to address every phase of flight, working out which interference paths are credible enough to need assessment. A National E3 Airworthiness Technical Authority can approve an alternate assessment procedure, provided it stays compatible with the referenced civil guidance, and existing evidence can sometimes be reused rather than re-generated: type certification data evaluated against FAA or EASA HIRF regulation, or test data evaluated against AECTP-500 or a national equivalent, can support a T-PED tolerance assessment. The result of the assessment is one of three outcomes: the risk is negligible and needs no action, it is manageable and gets documented and mitigated, or it is judged significant and unmanageable, in which case the document requires the prohibition to be documented. Where a restriction does apply, it goes into the Aircraft Flight Manual or Operating Instructions, not into a separate compliance record.
A dedicated section addresses Radio Frequency Identification devices: frequency assignments have to stay outside aviation bands, and active or battery-assisted-passive RFID devices are treated as transmitting PEDs rather than as a class of their own. Another section sets out what an in-flight interference report should capture: the flight details, a description of the effect observed, what the crew did in response, and identification of the suspected device. And the document requires training: aircrew on the PED restrictions that apply to the aircraft they fly, cabin crew and anyone else using a PED on board on the interference aspects specific to that device and aircraft.
The document gives two routes into the same outcome. For a new aircraft type, or a major modification to one, the RTCA/DO-307 design and certification route applies, and its recommendations "closely follow existing practices for aircraft system High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) protection". For a fleet that is already flying, allowing a new class of T-PED technology runs through the RTCA/DO-294C route instead, which evaluates the existing aircraft's immunity rather than its design. An operator responsible for a fleet may document one evaluation covering the whole fleet, unless significant variation within it calls for a separate assessment.
The document is explicit about its own boundary. Concerns specific to weapons safety, such as hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance and electro-explosive device safety margins, along with emission security and control, are placed "beyond the scope of this document" and are addressed elsewhere. Interference to terrestrial communication networks and spectrum licensing is likewise outside its scope. And no organisation is certified against AAEP-05: what a National (E3) Airworthiness Technical Authority grants is a Technical Airworthiness Clearance for a specific aircraft type or fleet, not a certificate held by a company.
Evidencing AAEP-05 is engineering and airworthiness-authority work: the coupling-path analysis and testing, the interference path loss calculations, and the Technical Airworthiness Clearance decision itself are done in a test programme and on the aircraft, not in software, and that is where the work has to stay. What ComplyTrain does is hold the paper trail that work produces and keep it controlled and available: the assessment and risk-mitigation records, the aircrew and cabin-crew training records the document requires, the in-flight interference reports, and the restrictions that end up written into the Aircraft Flight Manual or Operating Instructions. That means version control over documents that change as an aircraft's cleared PED list changes, an audit trail for who trained on what and when, and a single place to produce the evidence when a National Technical Airworthiness Authority asks for it.
ComplyTrain does not run the EMC testing, does not calculate an interference path loss or a target level, and does not generate type-certification data or stand in for the airworthiness authority's clearance decision. What applies to a given programme, and which standards sit alongside AAEP-05 for it, is set by the contract and the customer's airworthiness requirement. You can see what else is catalogued near it in the standards explorer, and if you want to talk through how the documentation side fits your programme, we are glad to.
Tell us how you need to work with AAEP-05 and what you need from it. We will come back to you about what ComplyTrain can do.
Thank you. Your list is on its way to your inbox, and we will come back to you on what working with these standards in ComplyTrain involves, usually within one business day.
It binds through STANAG 7230, which records the agreement of NATO nations to use the publication. Whether it reaches a given organisation, and on what terms, depends on the nation's own implementation and on the contract or airworthiness clearance requirement that cites it, not on the document by itself.
A PED is any portable electronic device; a T-PED is one that transmits, such as a phone on cellular, WiFi or Bluetooth. AAEP-05 covers both and treats active RFID tags as T-PEDs, since they also radiate intentionally.
No. AAEP-05 directs participating nations to those civil documents, and to their EUROCAE equivalents ED-118 and ED-130, for the actual test methods and data, adjusted where needed for military-specific PEDs and aircraft.
No organisation is certified against AAEP-05. What exists is a Technical Airworthiness Clearance that a National (E3) Airworthiness Technical Authority grants for a specific aircraft type or fleet, based on the analysis or testing carried out. ComplyTrain helps hold the documentation and training records that assessment relies on.
The document names two triggers: a new aircraft type or a major design change, worked through the RTCA/DO-307 route, and a decision to allow a new class of T-PED technology on an aircraft that is already flying, worked through the RTCA/DO-294C route.
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