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AJP-3.16

AJP-3.16 security force assistance doctrine

NATO commanders and staffs who plan, conduct and assess security force assistance, and the coalition partners and civilians named alongside them

AJP-3.16 is NATO's doctrine for planning, conducting and assessing security force assistance to a host nation's local forces, agreed to by nations under STANAG 6512; it guides commanders and staffs, not companies.

Edition
B
Published
2025-08

What it is

What AJP-3.16 governs

AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance, is NATO's doctrine for "the military planning, execution and assessment of SFA in the context of Allied joint operations, with particular focus on transition." Security force assistance (SFA) itself is defined as "all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of the capability and capacity of local forces (LF) and their associated institutions," where local forces are indigenous, non-NATO military security forces. Nations record their agreement to use the document in STANAG 6512, so it binds through that ratified agreement rather than through a contract or a law reaching into a company. The current edition is Edition B, Version 1, promulgated August 2025, superseding Edition A, Version 1, which nations were told to destroy under their own local document-destruction procedures.

Who it is written for

The document names its primary readership directly: "AJP-3.16 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs." It adds a secondary readership: the doctrine "is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations," and "also provides a reference for NATO civilians and other governments and civilian entities." No supplier, manufacturer or acquirer appears anywhere in it. SFA itself is bounded further: it "applies only where a HN requests assistance from NATO to train and develop LF," and NATO's own SFA activities "require North Atlantic Council approval."

Principles, understanding and personnel selection

Chapter 1 sets out the principles a commander applies when delivering SFA: political primacy (the "essential cornerstone" of successful SFA), a comprehensive approach, unity of effort, understanding, trust, leadership, legitimacy, rule of law, strategic communications considerations, transparency, host-nation commitment, support for host-nation ownership, sustainability and transition. Legitimacy depends on the interplay of mandate, manner, consent and expectations. Rule of law is described as "a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards," and host-nation commitment "should include the commitment to respect and ensure respect of human rights and other applicable aspects of international law." The chapter also covers understanding the local forces, cultural awareness, and the risks of cultural misunderstanding, and closes with how NATO selects and trains its own personnel for SFA roles, noting that "advisers could be isolated, captured and interrogated."

The SFA framework: planning, assessment and transition

Chapter 2 covers how SFA is planned, following AJP-5 and the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, with subject matter experts supporting the joint operation planning group. Force protection is a "principal consideration" throughout. Assessment identifies four functions a local force performs - governance, executive, generating, and operating - and is itself compartmented into organizational, operational, environmental and institutional assessments that establish a baseline and identify capability gaps, tracked through measures of performance and effectiveness. Transitions - the progressive transfer of security responsibilities to the host nation - are described as "a multinational and interagency process," "a negotiated process," and "informed by assessment." The document names specific transition risks: timing, state instability, "human rights abuses and violations of international law" where warring parties have been responsible for them, conflict of interests, legitimacy, and political capture.

The SFA activities: generate, organize, train, enable, advise, mentor

Chapter 3 groups SFA activities under the acronym "GOTEAM." Generating builds the systems, structures and workforce for a sustainable local-force capability, and the document notes that "NATO does not necessarily lead the generation process." Organizing shapes a host nation's own structures rather than replicating NATO's. Training, "typically the most visible and recognized SFA activity," carries a specific legal-consistency requirement: it "should promote the knowledge of, and respect for the relevant law (local and international), including the law of armed conflict," covering international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, and the legal consequences of breaches including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Enabling covers services from policy development to facilities and equipment support. Advising covers recommendations that "cannot be enforced" by the adviser, defined as "an individual (uniformed, civilian, or contractor) tasked to develop civilian and military institutions within a local security establishment," and divided into principal, process and subject-matter-expert advisers. Mentoring "is about leadership and relationships."

Human rights, legal considerations and cross-cutting topics

The document says that "the legal status and jurisdiction of NATO forces or their civilian or contractor component should be established in a legally binding written agreement with the HN (e.g. a status of force agreement)," validated "well before NATO personnel enter the HN territory," and that any SFA activity "has to be consistent with the legal framework pertaining to the operation." On protection of civilians, commanders and staffs are to "integrate PoC perspectives and remaining human security considerations into the planning process," including delivering "international law and human rights training programmes to LF." A dedicated section addresses SFA and NATO's cross-cutting topics: protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, cultural property protection, women, peace and security, conflict-related sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, combating trafficking in human beings, and building integrity, where "corruption risk perception must be included in the planning of SFA operations."

How you are evaluated

None. AJP-3.16 names no certification body, no government quality-assurance surveillance, no notified body, no self-declaration route and no customer audit. The assessment mechanisms it describes (the organizational, operational, environmental and institutional assessments, and the measures of performance and effectiveness) evaluate a host nation's local forces, not a company. The nearest thing it carries to a check on the document itself is a nation's own reservation recorded against the ratified STANAG at promulgation, a diplomatic and military process between NATO and its member nations.

How we help

AJP-3.16 binds NATO commanders and staffs, not companies, and it describes no scheme a business is certified or assessed against. The narrow places where it touches contracted or commercial work are the ones it names itself: the legal status of NATO forces "or their civilian or contractor component" should be established in a legally binding written agreement with the host nation, and an adviser role that can be filled by "an individual (uniformed, civilian, or contractor)". For an organization working in either of those positions, ComplyTrain gives you a place to hold the procedures, training records and evidence trail that role would ask for, version-controlled and ready to show a customer or a legal reviewer.

ComplyTrain does not plan, conduct or assess security force assistance, does not draft or provide the legal work behind the written agreement the document says should establish a contractor's status with a host nation, and does not stand in for the NATO commanders, advisers, trainers or mentors the document describes. That happens in the relationship between NATO forces and a host nation, not in software.

Which doctrine and which standards actually apply to a given contract is set by the contract and the customer's quality clause, not by this page. See the standards explorer for what sits alongside AJP-3.16, and talk to us about the evidence trail behind it.

Standards it references

Questions

Is AJP-3.16 mandatory for a company?

No. AJP-3.16 binds nations, which record their agreement to use it by ratifying STANAG 6512, and a nation can ratify with reservations. A company meets it only indirectly, typically where a status-of-force agreement or a support contract built on top of a ratified arrangement requires something of it.

What does AJP-3.16 actually cover?

The principles and framework for NATO security force assistance to a host nation's local forces: planning, assessment and transition, and the six activities NATO groups as "generate, organize, train, enable, advise and mentor." It also sets out legal and human-rights considerations and NATO's cross-cutting topics for SFA.

Is there a certification against AJP-3.16?

No. AJP-3.16 names no certification body, notified body or accredited scheme of any kind. It is guidance for a NATO military chain of command, not a standard a company or product is assessed against.

Does AJP-3.16 mention contractors?

Briefly, in two places. It says the legal status of "civilian or contractor" personnel should be established in a legally binding written agreement with the host nation before anyone enters its territory, and it defines an adviser as "an individual (uniformed, civilian, or contractor)."

What edition of AJP-3.16 is current?

Edition B, Version 1, promulgated August 2025. It superseded Edition A, Version 1, which nations were told to destroy under their own local document-destruction procedures once the new edition took effect.