What it is
STANAG 6513 is a NATO Standardization Agreement, Edition 1, promulgated 13 April 2016. It is not a technical specification. It is the agreement by which NATO nations commit to ratify and implement ATP-3.16.1, Edition A, the Allied Publication on countering insider threats. The doctrine itself, not this cover, is where the substance lives: the interoperability requirement stated in the STANAG is that "this doctrine will contribute to interoperability by describing NATO with a useful framework to understand, prevent, and counter insider threats and insider acts of violence during Allied joint operations." It adds that the doctrine "explains the nature of insider threats and insider attacks" and "provides guidance on the fundamentals of countering those threats while working with host nation security forces." Read on its own, STANAG 6513 requires almost nothing of a supplier directly. Its obligations run to nations, and it reaches an organisation supporting an Allied operation only once a nation has implemented it and a specific tasking or contract invokes the doctrine.
Who it binds, and how
STANAG 6513 is explicit that it binds nations rather than organisations. Nations are "invited to examine their ratification of the STANAG and, if they have not already done so, advise the NSO of their intention regarding its implementation." Ratification and implementation are kept as separate steps, and the document defines implementation precisely: this STANAG and ATP-3.16.1 "are implemented when the procedures detailed in ATP-3.16.1 have been incorporated in national regulations, manuals and training." So "is STANAG 6513 mandatory" has no single answer: it depends on whether a given nation has ratified and implemented it, and, for an organisation supporting an Allied operation, on whether a specific tasking or contract then invokes the doctrine that implementation puts in place.
What the agreement actually commits nations to
The stated aim is to respond to an interoperability requirement, met by "describing NATO with a useful framework to understand, prevent, and counter insider threats and insider acts of violence during Allied joint operations." Under "Agreement," participating nations "agree to implement the following standard," named as ATP-3.16.1, Edition A. None of this is written as a duty on a supplier; it is a duty on the nation, and on the NATO and national bodies that turn the doctrine into national regulations, manuals and training.
A cover agreement, not the doctrine itself
A reader who only has STANAG 6513 in hand does not yet have the doctrine it points to. The actual content on countering insider threats sits in ATP-3.16.1, Edition A. Other related documents named alongside it are STANAG 2437, which covers AJP-01, allied joint doctrine; STANAG 2190, which covers AJP-2, allied joint doctrine for intelligence, counter-intelligence and security; STANAG 2490, which covers AJP-3, allied joint doctrine for the conduct of operations; STANAG 2288, which covers AJP-3.2, allied joint doctrine for land operations; STANAG 2180, which covers AJP-3.4, allied joint doctrine for non-Article 5 crisis response operations; STANAG 2181, which covers AJP-3.4.1, the military contribution to peace support; STANAG 2611, which covers AJP-3.4.4, counterinsurgency doctrine; and STANAG 2528, which covers AJP-3.14, allied joint doctrine for force protection.
Reporting and review
National ratification and implementation decisions "are provided to the NSO," recorded in the NATO Standardization Document Database. Nations are "requested to provide to the NSO their actual STANAG implementation details," using the reporting forms in AAP-03: the form in Annex H for nations and the form in Annex G for partner nations. The STANAG itself "is to be reviewed at least once every three years," with the result "recorded within the NSDD" - a check on whether the agreement is still current, not an audit of any organisation. It is supervised under the authority of MC, MCLSB, LO, SLDP.
What it does not cover
STANAG 6513 names no indicator, screening criterion or detection method for identifying an insider threat, and no assessment or certification scheme for an organisation or a force. The only stated check is that the STANAG itself is reviewed periodically. Any operational detail on countering insider threats sits in ATP-3.16.1, which this cover does not reproduce.