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AAS3P-23

AAS3P-23 safety assessment testing for mortar cartridges

A mortar cartridge developer running an S3 assessment test programme, and the national S3 authority that approves tailoring and determines the result

AAS3P-23 is NATO's safety and suitability for service (S3) test framework for mortar cartridges and bombs, covering what evidence a developer's test programme must produce and how the appropriate S3 authority evaluates it.

Edition
A
Published
2020-03
Evaluated by
government-surveillance

What it is

AAS3P-23 is the NATO Allied Publication that sets out the safety and suitability for service (S3) assessment testing framework for mortar cartridges - the complete round, comprising projectile and propelling system, fired from a mortar cannon. It covers high explosive, smoke, illumination, less-than-lethal, inert and training variants across the 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm calibres in common NATO service. The document says it was agreed under STANAG 4629, and is written for the personnel who plan and run an S3 test programme, in practice most often the round's developer, to gather evidence across the item's life cycle that it is "safe for use". This is Edition A, Version 1, promulgated March 2020; our catalogue records the mortar-cartridge-specific agreement, STANAG 4764, as the document's cover.

AAS3P-23 applies to "NATO, multi-national collaborative and national acquisition of mortar cartridges". It explicitly excludes safety testing of weapons or fuzes, is not intended to address nuclear munitions, and is not a reliability, effectiveness or performance test programme, except where a shortfall there would itself represent a direct safety hazard. In-service surveillance and stockpile reliability once a round is fielded are governed elsewhere: the document states plainly that it "does not define the In-Service Surveillance or Stockpile Reliability test requirements", pointing instead to STANAG 4675 and AOP-62 through 64.

Who plans the programme, and who approves it

Two roles run through the whole document. The round's developer plans and executes the test programme: a Safety Assessment Report identifying potential hazards "shall be submitted by the material developer to the tester prior to commencement of testing", and the developer is the one reviewing prior design, safety and test data to scope the detailed test plan. The other role is the national S3 authority, or "other appropriate authorities", who approve test tailoring and any deviation from the standard Life Cycle Environmental Profile, and who ultimately determine the round's overall safety and suitability status from the evidence submitted. Nothing in AAS3P-23 describes an accredited third party auditing against a published scheme; the approving party is a national government authority, reviewing evidence against its own criteria.

Building the test programme around a life cycle profile

The starting point is a Life Cycle Environmental Profile (LCEP): the storage, transportation and deployment environments a mortar cartridge is expected to encounter, drawn from AECTP 100's environmental factors and usage profiles, run as a hot and a cold sequential stream. Where a round's actual profile diverges materially from the baseline this AP assumes, the test specification is meant to be adjusted, and any deviation from the standard LCEP needs the national S3 authority's approval before testing begins.

The test programme itself combines several distinct strands set out across the document's annexes: sequential environmental tests that expose the round to combined climatic and dynamic stresses in the sequence it would actually experience them; non-sequential climatic and dynamic environmental tests for stresses that do not need to run in sequence; firing tests and system tests that characterise how the round and its mortar interact; and a Breakdown Test and Critical Analysis (BTCA), a disassembly and detailed inspection of the most heavily stressed test articles that both AAS3P-23 and later in-service surveillance lean on for evidence of residual safety margin.

Inspection and the evidence trail

Escalating inspection levels run around the test sequence. The initial baseline inspections "verify conformance of the munition and packaging to build standards" against the production drawings; a Level 1 inspection is a basic visual check; a Level 2 inspection adds radiography and non-destructive examination; and an optional Level 3 inspection, the BTCA, "consists of Level 2 Inspection and additional tests" and requires disassembling the round to examine its components directly. Any test tailoring - eliminating a test, reducing a sample quantity, or reducing a severity - has to be documented with its rationale and approved by the national S3 authority before testing starts. Facilities and instrumentation have their own baseline: test equipment "calibrated periodically to laboratory standards whose calibration is traceable to national laboratory standards", with records retained by the test facility.

What sits alongside AAS3P-23 rather than inside it

A full S3 package draws on several other governing documents that AAS3P-23 names but does not itself define in detail: munition hazard classification (STANAG 4123), insensitive munitions assessment (STANAG 4439 and AOP-39), munition software safety assessment (AOP-52), fuze safety (STANAG 4187 and STANAG 4157), electromagnetic environmental effects (AECTP 250 and AECTP 500, under STANAG 4370), demilitarisation and disposal assessment (STANAG 4518), explosive materials qualification (STANAG 4170), and range safety and sustainability (AOP-15). Mortar integration is assessed separately too: "Appropriate testing and analysis shall be performed to assess mortar integration for new mortar cartridges entering the inventory." The results of all of this, together with AAS3P-23's own tests, compile into a Munition Safety Data Package, which is what the appropriate S3 approving authority actually reviews.

How the result is evaluated

The document itself says formal safety testing "is required to establish test data, which supports the issuance of the safety certification" - but read that carefully: the certification attaches to the specific round, not to a supplier or its management system, and the document adds that "The tests may indicate that limitations or restrictions must be imposed when the safety certification is issued", for example on the environments the round may be exposed to or on how it is handled and transported. The document is explicit that the compiled evidence goes "for use by the appropriate S3 approving authority in determining the overall S3 for mortar cartridges". That is a national government authority reaching its own determination from submitted evidence, not an accredited body auditing against a published scheme. AAS3P-23 does not name a certification body, and nothing in it makes a supplier "AAS3P-23 certified".

NATO's Standardization Document Database is the authoritative source for AAS3P-23 and the documents around it. NATO's documents are free of charge; we credit NATO for the catalogue and neither sell nor host a copy ourselves.

How we help

AAS3P-23 describes a physical test programme - environmental chambers, live firing ranges, BTCA disassembly and chemical analysis of energetic materials - and none of that work happens in software. What sits alongside the testing is a documentation load: the Safety Assessment Report, the test-tailoring rationale and its approval record, LCEP deviations, inspection records at each level, and the Munition Safety Data Package that compiles it all for the national S3 authority.

ComplyTrain gives a programme or quality team a controlled place to hold that evidence trail: the Safety Assessment Report and its version history, tailoring and deviation approvals, inspection checklists and completed records, and training records for the people who planned or reviewed the programme. That is the same evidence discipline ComplyTrain supports across any technical standard's documentation and audit trail, not something specific to munitions testing.

What ComplyTrain does not do: it does not run, witness or interpret any of the environmental, firing or BTCA tests, does not calculate margins of safety or decide what tailoring is acceptable, and does not issue, on our own account or the developer's behalf, the safety certification that only the appropriate S3 approving authority grants.

Which tier of S3 evidence a given programme needs is set by the contract and the customer's quality clause, not by us. See what else sits alongside AAS3P-23 in the standards explorer, and talk to us about the documentation trail behind an S3 assessment.

Standards it references

Questions

Is a supplier "AAS3P-23 certified"?

No. AAS3P-23 describes a test programme and the evidence it produces; it names no certification body or accredited scheme a supplier applies to. The document's own language is that testing "supports the issuance of the safety certification" for the specific round, issued by the appropriate S3 approving authority, not a certification of the supplier or its management system.

Is AAS3P-23 mandatory?

It says it was agreed under STANAG 4629, the general S3 assessment testing agreement, and our catalogue records the mortar-cartridge-specific STANAG 4764 as its cover. Either way, a supplier meets AAS3P-23 because a NATO, multi-national or national acquisition programme calls for it, not because the AP has force on its own.

Does AAS3P-23 cover the mortar cannon as well as the cartridge?

No. AAS3P-23's scope is the mortar cartridge itself; the document "excludes safety testing of weapons or fuzes", which are qualified separately.

What is the difference between AAS3P-23 and AAS3P-1?

AAS3P-1 sets out the general safety and suitability for service assessment discussion and defines what "safe for use" means. AAS3P-23 is the munition-type-specific document that applies that framework to mortar cartridges in particular.

Does AAS3P-23 cover in-service surveillance or reliability testing?

No. The document "does not define the In-Service Surveillance or Stockpile Reliability test requirements", and is not intended for assessing effectiveness, reliability or performance unless a shortfall there would itself be a direct safety hazard. Those areas are governed separately, under STANAG 4675 and AOP-62 through 64.