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AEP-99
National test authorities and laboratories assessing the thorax injury risk of non-lethal projectiles
AEP-99 is NATO's laboratory method for assessing the thorax injury risk of non-lethal projectiles, run by a National Authority using a physical surrogate or a validated simulation.
AEP-99 is a NATO Allied Engineering Publication that sets out a laboratory method for assessing the thorax injury risk of non-lethal, non-penetrative projectiles - a round fired from a non-lethal weapon at a person's chest. The document draws its own boundary clearly at clause 1.1, where AEP-94 "assesses the penetrative impact" of a non-lethal projectile, while AEP-99 covers only the blunt, non-penetrative case. It is Edition B, Version 1, promulgated July 2021.
AEP-99 does not bind anyone by itself. It is covered by STANREC 4744, a NATO Standardization Recommendation rather than a ratified agreement, so a nation is invited to apply the method, not committed to it. Annex F, which records France's reservations against the current edition, notes that "the adoption procedures and the rules of a STANREC do not allow each nation to add its comments or reservations about the document and the assessment procedure" anywhere else, which is why that appendix exists at all. For a company that makes non-lethal projectiles, the document is a further step removed still: it reaches them only when a national test programme or a contract calls for a projectile to be assessed this way.
The text speaks to the National Authority that oversees an assessment and to the test facility that carries it out, not to a manufacturer's own quality system. Clause 2.2.1 addresses "the test facility employed for the thorax injury risk assessment" directly. Clause 2.2.2 has the National Authority verifying that a substitute launch system's impact conditions match the original weapon. Clause 2.3.1 has the National Authority computing and documenting the statistical result of a surrogate validation, and clause 3.3 leaves it to the National Authority to choose and demonstrate a method for validating a numerical projectile model. A manufacturer's own instructions appear only once, as one input the test facility may consult when setting the launcher-to-target distance (clause 2.2.3).
The document gives a test facility two routes to the same injury criterion, defined in clause 1.3. The first, in Chapter 2, uses a mechanical surrogate: a physical dummy thorax that must first be validated and then recalibrated before each test session, with the National Authority deciding whether a failed calibration means the surrogate needs revalidating entirely (clauses 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). An impact only counts toward the assessment if it is a "fair shot": inside the surrogate's validated area, and fired under conditions matching the original weapon system when a substitute launcher is used (clause 2.1.3). The second, in Chapter 3, uses numerical simulation instead of a physical shot: a validated model of the thorax and a validated model of the projectile, with the projectile model itself checked against a rigid wall before it is trusted against the thorax model (clause 3.2.2).
Both routes carry an extensive record-keeping requirement. For the physical route, clause 2.3.3 asks for target and projectile identification, shooting distance, date, ambient conditions, weapon and launcher details, impact location, and, for each shot, its fairness, velocity, angles, the displacement signal and the resulting injury criterion value, plus the calibration and validation results relied on. For the numerical route, clause 3.5 asks for the equivalent: model and projectile identification, validation data, and, per simulated shot, velocity, location, the displacement signal and the injury criterion value.
Two exclusions are easy to miss on a first read. Clause 1.2.2 states plainly that "the event of repeated shots on a single anatomical region is not covered by this document." And the document is limited throughout to skeletal injury from a frontal, sternal impact; it says nothing about heart injury risk. Annex F's French reservation calls both limits out directly, alongside a broader objection: that the injury criterion this method relies on has not, in France's view, been shown to be valid outside the impact-speed range the underlying research covered, or for a surrogate whose realism above that range is unproven. France states that on those grounds, the current edition "will not be applied by France."
There is no certification for AEP-99, and no accredited body assesses a projectile against it. What the document describes instead is a National Authority verifying and documenting a specific test or simulation directly - checking that a substitute launch system behaves like the original weapon (clause 2.2.2), computing and documenting a validation's statistical result (clause 2.3.1), deciding whether a failed calibration means revalidating the surrogate (clause 2.3.2), and choosing how to validate a numerical projectile model (clause 3.3). That is government verification of a specific piece of testing, not a certificate a company or a product can hold.
AEP-99 hands off to AEP-94 for penetrative impacts, the case this document explicitly excludes (clause 1.1). It is covered by STANREC 4744, the recommendation a nation adopts rather than ratifies, and the instrument Annex F uses to record France's reservation. Its definitions of mean point of impact and R90 are drawn from the NATO glossary that STANAG 3680 carries (clause 2.1.2). And Annex G records that AEP-99's own structure, header, chapters and table of contents were revised to match AEP-103's format, though AEP-103 is not a normative reference for the method itself.
AEP-99 is an operational and technical publication, not a management-system standard: there is no certificate to hold against it, and no software runs the ballistic or numerical assessment it describes. That work happens in a test facility under a National Authority's oversight, not in a document system, and this page offers no view of its own on non-lethal weapons or the method's validity.
Where ComplyTrain fits is the paperwork around that work: holding the procedure a company follows when a customer or a national test programme calls for an AEP-99 assessment, keeping the test or simulation reports a National Authority or test facility hands back as controlled, auditable records tied to the specific projectile batch they cover, and giving staff who read a tender the training record showing they understand what a reference to AEP-99 or STANREC 4744 actually commits the company to.
ComplyTrain does not fire a mechanical surrogate, run a numerical thorax simulation, or decide whether a projectile's injury criterion result is acceptable; that judgement, and the laboratory work behind it, stays with the test facility and the National Authority that oversees it. Which tier of assessment a given contract actually requires, and which related publications come with it, is set by the contract and the customer's quality clause, not by us; the standards explorer shows what sits alongside AEP-99, and we're glad to talk through what a specific tender is asking for.
Tell us how you need to work with AEP-99 and what you need from it. We will come back to you about what ComplyTrain can do.
Thank you. Your list is on its way to your inbox, and we will come back to you on what working with these standards in ComplyTrain involves, usually within one business day.
Not on its own. AEP-99 is covered by STANREC 4744, a NATO recommendation rather than a ratified agreement, so a nation is invited to apply it and can record a reservation instead, as France has done for the current edition. A company meets it only when a national test programme or a contract specifically calls for a projectile to be assessed this way.
AEP-99 assesses the injury risk of a blunt, non-penetrative impact from a non-lethal projectile. AEP-94 covers the penetrative case instead. AEP-99's own scope clause draws this line explicitly, handing penetrative impacts off to AEP-94.
A test facility runs the ballistic or numerical assessment, and a National Authority validates the surrogate or model, verifies the test conditions, and computes and documents the statistical result. The document is not written as something a manufacturer self-assesses against.
No. AEP-99 describes no certification scheme, no accredited body and no notified body. A National Authority verifies and documents a specific test or simulation directly, which is government verification of that piece of testing, not a certificate a product or a company can hold.
France's recorded reservation argues that the injury criterion the method relies on is not shown to be valid outside the impact-speed range the underlying research covered, that the surrogate's realism above that range is unproven, and that the document only assesses skeletal injury, saying nothing about heart injury risk. On those grounds France states the current edition will not be applied.
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