Platform
Modules
By sector
By sector
By standard
Blog
News
Events
AEP-94
Test facilities and National Authorities running non-lethal kinetic-energy projectile skin-penetration assessments
AEP-94 is a NATO test method for judging whether a non-lethal kinetic-energy projectile penetrates a synthetic skin surrogate.
AEP-94 is a NATO Allied Engineering Publication that defines a laboratory assessment method for judging the risk that a non-lethal kinetic-energy projectile penetrates human skin (clause 1.1). It does this by testing against a surrogate material that stands in for skin rather than against people, and it standardises how the outcome of that test is recorded so results from different laboratories and nations can be compared.
The publication is not itself something a company signs up to. It is covered by STANREC 4744, a NATO recommendation rather than a ratified agreement: nations are invited to use this method, not committed to it by ratification. A programme, a contract or a National Authority is what actually puts AEP-94 in front of a test facility.
The document addresses whoever carries out the test, not a manufacturer's management system. A test facility is expected to provide the conditions the method requires (clause 2.3.1). Where the original weapon cannot be used and a substitute launcher stands in for it, a National Authority has to confirm the substitute produces impact conditions equivalent to the original system (clause 2.3.2) - a check the document places with a national authority, not with the test facility itself.
AEP-94 defines what counts as a penetration for the purposes of the test (clause 2.1.2), and a projectile is judged not to cause penetration at the distance tested only if the test sequence records none (clause 2.2.1). It does not certify a projectile, a manufacturer or an organisation: it produces test results, and how those results feed a wider qualification or acceptance decision is a matter for the programme or authority that asked for the test, not for AEP-94 itself.
The publication expects a defined, per-shot record for every test, not whatever a facility happens to keep. Observations run from target identification, shooting distance and the date of testing through to weapon and projectile details, and for each shot the impact location, whether the shot was fair, the projectile velocity, and the penetration result, entered on a Test Data Sheet, alongside a reference to the calibration results for the surrogate used (clause 2.5.7). This evidentiary detail is the part of AEP-94 most relevant to a compliance function: proving a test happened as described is a documentation problem, separate from the ballistic work itself.
AEP-94 sets out no certification, audit or accreditation scheme, and names none for a reader to seek out. It does not say when in a procurement or development programme the assessment has to be run, only how to run it once it is called for. Its own Annex B revision history records that this edition brought AEP-94's structure and phrasing into line with AEP-103 and added a gelatine-preparation annex, without stating what earlier edition it replaces. AEP-94's reference list also cites STANAG 2920 on the classification of personal armour as background reading rather than a binding requirement.
Evidencing AEP-94 work is a records problem before it is anything else. A test facility running this assessment has to show which procedure it used, which equipment was in service and calibrated, who performed and witnessed each test, and that the Test Data Sheet observations for every shot were captured and retained, not just the topline pass or fail. When a substitute launcher is used, the National Authority's equivalence decision needs to be on file too, because that is the piece an auditor or a customer will ask for first if the original weapon was not used.
ComplyTrain does not run the ballistic test, prepare the surrogate, operate the launcher, or make the penetration call: that is laboratory work, done by hand, by the people qualified to do it. What ComplyTrain gives a test facility or the programme relying on its results is a controlled place for the paperwork around that work: procedures describing how the facility runs an AEP-94 assessment, equipment and calibration records tied to a person and a date, training records for staff operating the launcher and measurement equipment, and a document trail that links a specific test run back to the projectile design or programme decision it supports.
Which standards sit alongside AEP-94 for a given programme, and whether this is even the right test to run, is set by the contract and the customer's quality clause, not by us. The standards explorer shows what else is in scope for a non-lethal weapons programme; if you want to talk through where AEP-94 fits, get in touch.
Tell us how you need to work with AEP-94 and what you need from it. We will come back to you about what ComplyTrain can do.
Thank you. Your list is on its way to your inbox, and we will come back to you on what working with these standards in ComplyTrain involves, usually within one business day.
Not by itself. AEP-94 is covered by STANREC 4744, a NATO recommendation rather than a ratified agreement, so no nation commits to it by ratification alone. It becomes relevant to a supplier or test facility when a specific contract or test programme calls for a skin-penetration assessment against it.
STANREC 4744 is the NATO recommendation that points nations at AEP-94; AEP-94 is the technical document itself, holding the assessment method. A STANREC invites use rather than committing nations to it the way a STANAG's ratification does.
The document places the work with a test facility (clause 2.3.1). Where a substitute launcher is used instead of the original weapon, a National Authority has to confirm the substitute produces equivalent impact conditions before the results can be relied on (clause 2.3.2).
No, and no such certification exists to hold. AEP-94 sets out no certification, audit or accreditation scheme; it is a shared test method, not a standard an organisation is assessed against. ComplyTrain is a system for evidencing this kind of technical work, not a laboratory and not a certifying body.
Edition B, Version 1, promulgated in July 2021, is the current edition. Its own revision history records that this edition aligned AEP-94's structure and wording with AEP-103, among other changes, without stating what edition it replaced.
One system for the whole compliance programme. Start with the module you need most.
Collect information the same way every time, and decide in advance what happens next.
Know whether your controls are operating, not just whether a policy says they exist.
Turn the compliance work you already know about into a plan with owners, dependencies and dates.
Know what you can offer, and hold the evidence behind every configuration you offer it in.
Eight built-in reports across every module, scheduled, delivered, and filed where the evidence lives.
The sector news that matters to your organisation - read and rated by AI, and delivered as a scheduled digest in your own language.
AI reads the tender pack and pulls out the requirements, deadlines and rules - then helps you draft the response from your own approved content, with you reviewing every step.
One current register of the suppliers and partners you depend on - each risk-assessed, re-assessing itself on schedule, and wired straight into your risk register.
See every requirement you face - across every standard, plus your own contracts and policies - traced to the documents, evidence and processes that satisfy it.
Identify, score, treat and review your risks in one place - with AI to help anyone run a proper assessment, and a defensible trail behind every decision.
Assign training, prove it was understood, and hold the competence records an auditor asks for.
Draft compliance documents with AI, keep every version under control, and export them beautifully branded - all in one place.
Audits, corrective actions, processes and approvals in one quality system, organised around ISO 9001.
Medical device manufacturers operate under more regulatory pressure than almost any other sector outside pharmaceuticals. The rules govern how you design a device, how you make it, how you track it after it ships, and how you respond when something goes wrong.
Learn how EU dual-use export controls apply to encryption, sensors, and software, how classification works under Annex I, and why sending source code by email can count as an export.
A practical way to turn in-your-head risk management into a register that survives staff turnover and answers the risk questions now showing up in tenders.