What it is
AJP-3.22 is NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing: the doctrine that tells a commander and staff how to plan and conduct the police-related activities a NATO-led force uses to reinforce, or temporarily replace, an indigenous police force. Its own lexicon defines stability policing as activities "intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights." Edition A, Version 1, was promulgated 14 July 2016 and is "effective upon receipt." The preface is explicit about why it was written: despite NATO's experience in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, "there is no dedicated Allied Doctrine for Stability Policing (SP)" until this publication filled the gap. Nations agree to use it through STANAG 2616, so this is guidance for the people planning and running a mission, not a requirement written for a company.
Who this directs, and how a company might meet it
AJP-3.22 never names a supplier, manufacturer or acquirer as its audience. It is addressed to the military chain of command: "the commander and his staff are responsible for defining policing rules of engagement (ROE), specific executive powers (e.g. search, arrest, use of force), rules for the escalation of force and clear lines of accountability." The forces it expects to actually perform stability policing are named directly too: "the natural providers of resources devoted to stability policing activities are Military Police inclusive of Gendarmerie type forces when operating in a non-permissive environment." A commercial party appears only at the edge of that picture. The doctrine allows that "non-military actors may collaborate in stability policing activities such as: police forces with civil status, IOs, NGOs, and contractors," but only "on the basis of the mandate and the environment being permissive." None of that makes AJP-3.22 a requirement a company implements directly. What it reaches is a nation, through STANAG 2616 and that nation's own military structure, and this edition's front matter already carries national reservations from Germany, France, Slovakia and Slovenia recording where each departs from the text.
Replacement and reinforcing: two mission types, two sets of powers
The doctrine organises stability policing around two mission types, and the distinction that matters most is who holds executive police powers. Replacement applies "when the indigenous police or a recognised government is non-existent." Here, "NATO stability policing assets must be entitled with executive police powers, encompassing the use of force, as well as the power of search and arrest," covering tasks from area patrolling and control to criminal investigations and civil disturbance operations. Reinforcing applies when an indigenous police force exists but is not fully effective. Here the doctrine is just as direct in the other direction: "NATO stability policing assets will not be entitled to executive police powers, as these are retained by the indigenous police," and the role instead runs through named functions: monitoring, mentoring, advising, reforming (restructuring, rebuilding and inspecting), training and partnering. Chapter 3 then works through four stability activities the wider AJP 3 series already establishes: security and control, support to security sector reform (including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), support to restoration of services, and support to governance tasks. Annex A lists the specific tasks a stability policing capability may be asked to perform, from crowd and riot control, border control and election security through criminal investigations, forensics and biometrics to counter-terrorism and war crime investigations. Annex B sets out how the people who perform them are trained: three levels of general training, specialised training, on-the-job training, training of trainers, and a matrix of basic, advanced and management-level policing skills.
Law, human rights and the use of force
The doctrine returns to law, legitimacy and human rights throughout rather than in one clause. It states that "it is of paramount importance that all actions taken by a government and its agents in attempting to restore stability are legal and perceived as legitimate," and that "the rule of law, based on three pillars (law enforcement, judicial, and correctional) must be addressed concurrently, is fundamental to legitimate governance." Human rights violations appear as a listed factor under both mission types, and one of the named reforming functions, monitoring, is described as "observing, assessing and reporting (to the competent authority) on the performance of indigenous police forces, in order to ensure compliance with the human rights and best international police practices." Executive powers, including the use of force and the power of search and arrest, sit with NATO assets only in a replacement mission, as set out above.
The publications beneath and alongside it
AJP-3.22 describes itself as "linked with a number of AJP 3 series publications." It sits under AJP-3, the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, itself covered by STANAG 2490, and reads alongside AJP-3.2, Allied Land Operations, which it cites directly for the stability activities its own Chapter 3 elaborates. Beneath it sits the tactical-level guidance the text calls "ATP 3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks," recorded in our catalogue as ATP-32 and covered by STANAG 2606. The standards explorer lists the rest of what sits alongside this document.
How you get it
AJP-3.22 is published by the NATO Standardization Office and, like every NATO standardization document, carries no charge. The NSDD listing for AJP-3.22 is the authoritative source, and national standardization authorities can also supply a copy. We credit NATO for the catalogue and neither sell nor host a copy ourselves.