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AJP-3.9
NATO commanders and their staffs conducting joint targeting, with a lighter framework offered to NATO partners and non-NATO nations
AJP-3.9 is NATO doctrine setting out the roles, phases and legal framework of the joint targeting process that commanders and staffs use to select, prioritise and engage targets, agreed to by nations under STANAG 2524.
AJP-3.9 is NATO's Allied Joint Publication on joint targeting: the process by which a joint task force commander's staff select, develop, prioritise, approve, engage and assess targets in support of the commander's objectives. Nations record their agreement to use it in STANAG 2524. The document states plainly that it "is intended as guidance for NATO commanders and their staffs" and separately "provides a useful framework for joint targeting conducted by NATO members, partners, and non-NATO nations" - a weaker offer than the guidance given to NATO's own commands. It "is based on MC 471, NATO Targeting Policy" and "is directly subordinate to - and should be read together with AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine and AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations." Its own scope clause is explicit about what it leaves out: the procedures it describes "do not apply to close combat, non-conventional means, nor does it limit the exercise of self-defence." The current edition is Edition B, Version 1, promulgated 9 November 2021, superseding Edition A, which the letter of promulgation instructs be destroyed under local procedure.
The doctrine works through a six-phase joint targeting cycle (JTC): Phase 1, Commander's intent, objectives and targeting guidance, which turns strategic direction into North Atlantic Council (NAC)-approved target sets; Phase 2, Target development, which identifies valid targets through target system analysis and validates them, at a Target Validation Board, onto the joint target list, restricted target list or no-strike list; Phase 3, Capabilities analysis, which recommends the lawful actions available and produces a draft joint prioritized target list; Phase 4, Commander's decision, force planning and assignment, where the commander gives final approval; Phase 5, Mission planning and force execution; and Phase 6, Assessment, which measures whether the desired effects were created and feeds re-engagement recommendations back into the cycle. Targeting also runs along an "engagement continuum" between deliberate targeting, against "validated targets known to exist and intended to be prosecuted on either a scheduled or on-call basis," and dynamic targeting, for targets that arise "due to the dynamic changes in operations."
At the strategic level, the North Atlantic Council gives the Military Committee and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) the objectives and rules of engagement; SHAPE's Joint Effects Branch manages joint targeting on the Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Employment's behalf, and a Strategic Targeting Board and Targeting Clearance Board handle nominations that exceed a joint task force's authority. Sensitive targets, those "for which planned actions requires NATO strategic-level and/or national-level review and approval," go through a dedicated Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR) process, and individual nations may also run their own national STAR process for targets they consider sensitive. At the operational level, the Commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) directs the process, establishing boards including the Joint Coordination Board, the Joint Targeting Coordination Board and the Information Activities Coordination Board, and is responsible for developing and validating the joint target list, restricted target list, no-strike list and joint prioritized target list. At the tactical level, component commands nominate their own targets, including component critical targets, and may use one of three engagement processes: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Exploit, Assess; Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess; or Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse, Disseminate, the process used most by NATO's special operations forces.
The document defines and relates a family of target lists: the Candidate Target List (entities in development, not yet validated), the Target Nomination List, the Joint Target List (validated but not yet approved), the Restricted Target List (valid targets carrying specific constraints), the No-Strike List (entities protected under international law or policy, normally owned by the Commander JTF), the Joint Prioritized Target List (the formal order to component commands to engage) and the Prioritized Target List each component command derives from it. All target intelligence is held in electronic target folders on the NATO Joint Targeting System, drawing on the NATO Integrated Database. A chapter new to this edition, on intelligence support to joint targeting, describes the process as "a command-led, plans-based, operations-driven and coordinated and intelligence-enabled activity," run through target development coordination and target list management, and supported by a quality-control function that "assesses the accuracy of the supporting target intelligence."
The document is explicit, in its own terms, that identifying something as a potential target is not the same as being cleared to attack it: "the use of the term 'target' does not mean that they can be lawfully engaged in accordance with IHL/LOAC. A legal assessment (military necessity, distinction and proportionality and precautions in attack) has to be conducted prior any engagement." A legal advisor (LEGAD) "should be involved in the targeting process from the beginning," to "ensure that targeting efforts are aligned with the legal framework and that IHL/LOAC principles are integrated along the whole process from target discovery through validation and engagement." On proportionality specifically, the document states that "civilian losses expected from military action (collateral damage) must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated," and that "an engagement should be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one, or if excessive collateral damage is expected." It also requires that "formal records are kept of the decision-making process and any advice given during that process, especially during Phases 2 and 4." This page does not describe how a collateral damage estimate is calculated, what target selection or weaponeering criteria look like, or any other targeting technique: the document treats those as matters for certified analysts and national capabilities, not as content to summarise here.
AJP-3.9 names no certification, accreditation or notified-body scheme, and describes no mechanism for assessing a company, a product or a nation against the doctrine. The nearest thing to an evaluation is internal to the process it describes: Phase 6, Assessment, measures whether an operation's own desired effects were achieved, not compliance with the doctrine itself. Its scope clause also excludes close combat and the exercise of self-defence, which it says the document neither governs nor limits.
AJP-3.9 binds NATO commands and, through STANAG 2524, the nations that ratify it, not companies, and nothing here suggests otherwise. Where a company's work touches it at all is narrow: a training, intelligence-support or targeting-related services contract sitting underneath a NATO activity, of the kind implied by the document's own references to national capabilities providing target material, and to ATrainP-2, Training in the Law of Armed Conflict, as the reference for the legal training targeting staff need. For that kind of work, ComplyTrain is a place to hold the procedures a contract like that actually asks for: training records showing personnel completed the IHL/LOAC or role-specific training the contract requires, a controlled procedure for reviewing and version-controlling the organisation's own standard operating instructions against current doctrine, and the evidence trail a customer or a NATO quality reviewer would ask to see.
ComplyTrain has no role in the joint targeting process itself. It does not take part in target development, legal review, target validation, collateral damage estimation, weaponeering or mission execution: that happens inside NATO's own command structure, under a legal advisor's review and a commander's judgement, not in software.
Which standards and arrangements actually apply to a given contract are set by that contract and the customer's quality clause, not by this page. See the standards explorer for what sits alongside AJP-3.9, and talk to us about the evidence trail behind a support contract.
Tell us how you need to work with AJP-3.9 and what you need from it. We will come back to you about what ComplyTrain can do.
Thank you. Your list is on its way to your inbox, and we will come back to you on what working with these standards in ComplyTrain involves, usually within one business day.
No. AJP-3.9 binds NATO commands and, through STANAG 2524, the nations that ratify it, not companies. A supplier or contractor meets it only indirectly, where a training, intelligence-support or targeting-related contract built underneath a NATO activity requires something of it.
STANAG 2524 is the agreement by which nations commit to use AJP-3.9: "the agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2524." A nation ratifies the STANAG, and can do so with reservations, which is a separate step from actually applying the doctrine during an operation.
Not in the detail a targeting specialist would need. AJP-3.9 states that "NATO does not have a separate CDE methodology and uses current US CDE methodology (CJCSI 3160.01C), or as directed by the operational targeting directive," and treats the detailed methods, along with weaponeering and target selection standards, as work for certified analysts and national capabilities rather than content this doctrine spells out.
Edition B, Version 1, promulgated 9 November 2021. It is effective upon receipt and supersedes Edition A, Version 1, which was to be destroyed under local document-destruction procedure once the new edition took effect.
No such certification exists. AJP-3.9 names no certification body, notified body or accredited scheme; it is operational doctrine for NATO commanders and staffs, not a standard a company or product is assessed against.
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