AJP-5 Allied joint doctrine for the planning of operations

What it is

AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, is NATO's keystone doctrine for how commanders and their staffs plan Allied joint operations. The Preface states its purpose directly: it "presents an overarching framework of the key planning principles, considerations and processes that are followed when planning operations," describing "how planning activities and processes are integrated and coordinated to support decision-making and the production of plans, orders and directives." This edition, Edition B Version 1 of June 2026, superseded Edition A Version 2 and introduced two new annexes, on doctrinal frameworks and on future planning considerations.

Who it is for, and who it is not

The Application clause is direct: "AJP-5 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and their staff." It extends more loosely from there: "the doctrine is instructive to the planning of operations by a coalition of NATO Allies and/or North Atlantic Council approved Nations, NATO Partners, partner nations and non-NATO actors and for national planning within the framework of collective deterrence and defence," and "it also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO civilian actors." No supplier, manufacturer or acquirer appears anywhere in the document. This is guidance for a military chain of command, not a standard a company implements or is measured against.

How it acquires force

AJP-5 is doctrine, not a contract or a regulation, and it does not bind a company directly. NATO nations ratify a separate covering agreement: the Letter of Promulgation states, "The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2526." This edition "is effective on receipt and supersedes AJP-5, Edition A, Version 2, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedures for the destruction of documents." The coalition partners, NATO Partners and non-NATO actors named in the Application clause have not ratified that STANAG, which is why the text offers them instructive reading rather than an obligation. Where a company meets this world of doctrine in practice, it is normally through a subordinate publication or a specific contract clause, not through AJP-5 itself.

Fundamentals: tenets, principles and frameworks

Chapter 1 sets out the doctrinal terms the rest of the publication builds on. Four "key tenets of doctrine" guide all NATO planning: the behaviour-centric approach, which "recognises that people's attitude and behaviour are central to attaining the end state"; the comprehensive approach, defined as "combining all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort, to attain the desired end state"; the manoeuvrist approach, which "seeks to pit strength against vulnerabilities, mostly through indirect ways and means"; and mission command, built on "centralised intent and decentralised execution." Twelve principles of joint and multinational operations follow, from unity of effort and definition of objectives through to security, surprise, flexibility and sustainability, alongside six planning principles specific to this doctrine: strategic coherence, comprehensive understanding of the environment, mutual respect and trust, consultation and compatible planning, efficient use of resources, and flexibility and adaptability. The chapter closes with five doctrinal frameworks a commander uses to think about an operation - analytical, operations, functional, geographic and joint function - and with operational art, defined as "the employment of forces to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles."

NATO planning: context, categories and design

Chapter 2 covers the context planning happens in: NATO's three core tasks (deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, cooperative security), the continuum of competition, four campaign themes (peacetime military engagement, peace support, security, warfighting), the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operation, the legal context, gender perspective and human security. It sets out planning categories (advance versus response planning, support plans), planning documents (the NATO Response System, the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, and functional planning guides), and three planning methods - sequential, parallel and collaborative - each with its own stated advantages and disadvantages. It closes with operations design: the ends/ways/means/risks a commander must answer, and the design concepts that connect them - end state, transition and termination, centres of gravity, the direct versus indirect approach, objectives, decisive conditions, effects and actions, lines of operation, culmination, operational pause, sequencing and phases, and branches, sequels and decision points.

The seven planning activities

Chapter 3 works through NATO's operations planning process as seven sequential activities: planning initiation; mission analysis, which produces the initial operations design and the commander's planning guidance; courses of action (COA) development; COA analysis, including wargaming; COA validation and comparison; the commander's COA decision; and operation plan development, which produces first a concept of operations (CONOPS) and then the operation plan (OPLAN). Each activity has defined inputs and outputs and is validated with the commander before the next begins. The chapter closes with planning considerations that cut across all seven: the concurrent integrating processes (intelligence cycle, joint targeting cycle, information management, risk management, engagement space management), reinforcement and sustainment planning, interaction with non-military actors, gender perspective, human security, and multi-domain operations, built on four guiding principles - unity, interconnectivity, creativity and agility.

The four annexes

Annex A expands the operations, geographic and functional frameworks, and draws a concrete line between deep and close operations: "Operations conducted against the enemy in which combat contact is only established after 48 hours, are regarded as deep operations. Operations conducted against the enemy in which combat contact is established within 48 hours, are referred to as close operations" (clause A.27). Annex B gives a full method for centre of gravity (CoG) analysis - moral strategic CoGs, physical CoGs at each level of command, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities - closing with worked, numbered methods for applying it through a planning cycle. Annex C sets out wargaming: preconditions, three wargaming methods (by phases, to set decisive conditions, and in segments of the operating environment), and the conduct of a wargame itself. Annex D covers the newer domains of space and cyberspace and how multi-domain operations affect the joint functions, and is candid about its own limits: "this annex regards the operationalisation of MDO still as contingent," even though the underlying concept is endorsed by the Military Committee.

What is genuinely unusual here

Cyber effects are planned differently from every other domain: "available cyber effects are not known in advance to the planner/commander. Cyber effects are provided via a specific mechanism called SCEPVA (Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies). This makes planning cyber effects quite difficult" - nations, not NATO, retain operational control of offensive cyberspace capabilities. On timing, the document offers planners a concrete rule of thumb rather than leaving it open: "each headquarters should plan to use not more than one third of the time available to reach a commanders' decisions" (Chapter 3, Section 2, Commander's initial planning guidance), so subordinates have enough time left to plan and prepare in turn.

Where a company appears at all

The document has almost nothing to say about contracted or commercial activity. Sustaining actions are described as including "personnel and medical support, logistics, military engineering, finance and contracts, force protection." Space planning notes that planners "should synchronise the military need with commercial space capabilities," and multi-domain planning more broadly notes that "the collaborative use of non-military/commercial capabilities can reduce risk and improve the probability of mission success." Nothing beyond this touches a supplier's or contractor's own obligations.

What an assessor looks for

None, in the sense of a certification scheme for an organisation. AJP-5 names no accredited body, no notified body, no self-declaration route and no customer audit - it is doctrine for a NATO military chain of command, not a standard anyone outside it is assessed against. The nearest thing it describes is internal to that chain: during force and capability requirements development, "the JOPG establishes mission training and certification requirements for headquarters, personnel and forces deploying into the theatre," to check that deploying elements are trained and ready for a specific mission. That is a readiness check on forces, not a compliance certification a company can hold.

Related NATO doctrine

AJP-5 "builds on the principles described by the capstone publication AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine" and is "especially related to AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations," sharing a risk management approach that AJP-3's own annex models on ISO 31000. It is named alongside AJP-2 and AJP-4 as a level-1 keystone publication in its own References, and it cites AJP-6 directly for communication and information systems planning and AJP-10 for the strategic communications function that multi-domain operations draws on. More specific publications inform particular sections: AJP-4.2 for casualty estimation and medical support planning, AJP-3.16 for assessing military and security forces during mission analysis, AJP-3.19 for understanding non-military actors, and AJP-10.1 as the source of the behaviour-change model behind the broadened critical-capabilities analysis in centre of gravity work.

Standards it references

• AJP-01Background
• AJP-3Background
• AJP-2Background
• AJP-4Background
• AJP-6Background
• AJP-10Background
• ISO 31000Background
• AJP-4.2Background
• AJP-3.16Background
• AJP-3.19Background
• AJP-10.1Background