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ATP-3.3.4.7
National air forces and the engineering and acquisition staff who specify hose and drogue aerial refuelling equipment, plus the tanker and receiver aircrew who operate the signal lights.
ATP-3.3.4.7 is NATO's Allied Tactical Publication fixing the colours, positions and meanings of the signal lights a tanker shows a receiver aircraft in hose and drogue air-to-air refuelling, binding through STANAG 7215.
ATP-3.3.4.7 is the NATO Allied Tactical Publication that fixes the signal lights a tanker aircraft shows to a receiver aircraft during hose and drogue air-to-air refuelling, for crews operating both with and without night vision imaging systems (NVIS). It sets the colours, number, position, intensity and flashing behaviour of the lights, ties each signal to a mandatory or advisory instruction for the receiver crew, and states when fuel flow stops or is stopping. Edition B, Version 1 was promulgated in October 2023; the printed reservations refer back to "the reservation in edition 1", so this is at least a second edition, though the text does not itself say what it superseded.
Like any Allied Tactical Publication, ATP-3.3.4.7 does not bind a company by existing. Participating nations agree, under STANAG 7215, to use the display, meanings and principles it sets out "as a reference," and a nation implements it domestically when it has "issued instructions that all future equipment developed or services contracted will be in accordance with the requirements detailed in this agreement." A national reservation printed in this edition's front matter argues the substance is really "more a matter of materiel engineering and technical requirements" aimed at "the acquisition and engineering community" that specifies and buys hose and drogue AAR systems, rather than tactical aircrew doctrine in its own right. In practice the document reaches a national air force through ratification, an engineering or acquisition team through a contract or specification that invokes it, and a tanker or receiver aircrew through the operating procedures it describes. France, Italy and the United States have each recorded specific reservations against parts of it, so whether it applies to a given fleet or programme is a question for that nation's own instructions, not a general one.
Without NVIS, two sets of lights are required, each containing a RED, AMBER and GREEN light of equal intensity, positioned symmetrically one set either side of the refuelling hose (clauses 2.1.1-2.1.4). The duplication exists for redundancy against a single light failure, to reduce disorientation, and to raise the odds a receiver crew sees a full set of lights when it has to move off the centreline (clause 2.1.3).
Each light is ON, FLASHING or OFF (clause 2.1.5), and flash rate differs by colour, with FLASHING RED faster than FLASHING GREEN. Dimming carries one deliberate exception: "for signals involving the use of FLASHING RED lights, the lights shall ignore the dimmed setting and use full brilliance," while RED ON and every AMBER or GREEN signal, flashing or steady, "shall respect the dimmed setting" (clause 2.1.6). After a FLASHING RED signal has shown for 10-15 seconds it reverts automatically to RED ON (clause 2.1.7), and after a receiver disconnects, a RED ON signal is provided automatically if the system is not yet ready for another contact (clause 2.1.8).
FLASHING RED cancels every other signal and is the breakaway signal, a mandatory instruction to carry out the breakaway procedure described in ATP-3.3.4.2 (ATP-56(D)). RED ON cancels AMBER and GREEN and covers non-emergency disconnect and "maintain astern" or "too close, move aft" instructions. AMBER cancels GREEN and covers "move forward into refuelling range" and a low fuel-flow condition; GREEN covers a higher fuel-flow state and lets the receiver crew remain in range. FLASHING RED, RED ON and FLASHING AMBER are all "mandatory instructions to the receiver crew"; only a FLASHING GREEN signal leaves the receiver crew free to "remain in the refuelling range appropriate to the circumstances" (clause 2.2.3). Fuel flow "shall be stopped or shall be stopping" whenever FLASHING RED, RED ON, FLASHING AMBER or AMBER ON is displayed (clause 2.2.4). Annex A also splits the AMBER and GREEN fuel-flow signals by a flow-rate threshold, though a footnote to that Annex cautions that "the aircraft with very low fuel on load rates of less than 50 gal per min may observe a Flashing Green Light through the whole refuelling period," so the flow-based split will not read the same way for every receiver type.
Where NVIS makes coloured lights indistinguishable, Chapter 3 switches the coloured system off and replaces it with a count of lights - 3 for RED, 2 for AMBER, 1 for GREEN - carrying equivalent flashing, dimming, priority, breakaway and disconnect behaviour to Chapter 2. Positioning is more exacting here, because the receiver crew's task becomes counting rather than distinguishing colour: the spacing between the two light sets has to be greater than the spacing within a single set, specifically so a single light failure cannot be mistaken for a different, valid count (clause 3.3.4). Where the document describes what a receiver crew does about an odd, irregularly spaced count of lights, it is prescribing a flight-safety response for aircrew in that document, not advice this page is offering a reader.
The standard "shall not apply to Boom Drogue Adapter systems" (clause 1.4.1), and it "shall not cover signal lights used for either formation control or rendezvous" (clause 1.4.2). Its terminology also comes from elsewhere: "terms written with the first letter being capitalised shall have the meaning given to them in STANAG 3971" (clause 1.4.3), the general dimensional and functional characteristics of the equipment come from STANAG 3447, and the light colours themselves are defined in STANAG 3224 and Mil-C-25250, not in this document.
This edition's Record of Specific Reservations shows France excluding two specific aircraft fleets, Italy declining to retrofit its current fleet while endorsing the standard for future platforms, and the United States both disputing the document's classification as a tactical publication and declining to upgrade in-service AAR systems or apply it to newly purchased aircraft or services using older AAR equipment. The document itself notes the printed reservations "may not be complete" and points to the NATO Standardization Documents Database for the current list.
ATP-3.3.4.7 names no certification body, notified body or audit scheme anywhere in the text. It is implemented, per clause 1.5, when a nation has "issued the necessary orders/instructions to the forces concerned" to put the signal lights, displays, meanings and principles into any new drogue system it procures or fields - a matter of national instruction and acquisition, not third-party assessment. Conformity in practice runs through whatever engineering and airworthiness acceptance process the procuring nation already applies to a new aircraft system, and through the specification a contract writes against this document. The document itself is free of charge from NATO, listed and served through the NATO Standardization Document Database.
ATP-3.3.4.7 is an operational and engineering standard, not a management system: the work of meeting it is done in how a hose and drogue refuelling system is specified, built and used, not in software. ComplyTrain's role here is informational. It gives a defence supplier or an air force engineering team a place to hold the procedure that maps a signal-light design or a modification to the clauses of this document, train the relevant engineering and acquisition staff against the current edition, record which national reservations apply to a given fleet, and keep the evidence trail an acceptance review would ask for - for example, a controlled design-review record checking a new signal-light installation against the colour, flash-rate and priority requirements in Chapters 2 and 3 before a modification is signed off, or a document-control record tying a specific aircraft type to the reservations that apply to it.
ComplyTrain does not design or certify a signal-light system, does not replace a nation's own airworthiness or acceptance process, and takes no part in the operational decision an aircrew makes in response to a signal in flight. The applicable tier for a given programme, and the standards that come with it, are set by the contract and the customer's quality clause; our standards explorer shows what sits alongside ATP-3.3.4.7, including STANAG 7215 and the other Allied Publications it points to, and we are glad to talk through what a specific programme needs.
Tell us how you need to work with ATP-3.3.4.7 and what you need from it. We will come back to you about what ComplyTrain can do.
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Not on its own account. It binds through STANAG 7215, which a nation ratifies, and a nation then applies this ATP through its own instructions when it develops or contracts for new drogue equipment. Several nations, including the USA, France and Italy, have recorded reservations limiting how or whether it applies to specific fleets.
STANAG 7215 is the agreement nations ratify; ATP-3.3.4.7 is the technical publication it covers, setting out the actual light colours, positions, flash rates and signal meanings. A STANAG is rarely a specification in itself, the Allied Publication it points to usually holds that content.
No. The standard states plainly that it "shall not apply to Boom Drogue Adapter systems"; it covers podded store and integral hose and drogue systems only.
Edition B, Version 1, promulgated in October 2023. The document's own reservations refer to an earlier edition 1, but the text in front of us does not state what Edition B specifically superseded.
No. The agreement applies to future equipment developed or contracted; nations are only "recommended" to update current fleets for interoperability, on whatever timetable they choose.
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