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AEDP-02

AEDP-02 NATO ISR interoperability architecture

NATO and national engineers designing or integrating ISR systems for NATO and coalition interoperability

AEDP-02 Volume I is NATO's architecture description for ISR interoperability, mapping the STANAGs and Allied Publications that let NATO and national reconnaissance and surveillance systems exchange data.

Edition
1
Published
2018-01
Evaluated by
government-surveillance

What it is

What AEDP-02 governs

AEDP-02 is Volume I of the NATO Allied Engineering Documentation Publication (AEDP) describing the NATO Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Interoperability Architecture, known as the NIIA. It is not itself a technical specification a system implements. It is the architecture description that "identifies the specific standards to be implemented and describes how the standards fit together" (Foreword), so that NATO and national sensors, data links, imagery libraries, tracking systems and reporting tools can exchange data with each other. Nations record their agreement to use it in STANREC 4777, a Standardization Recommendation rather than a ratified STANAG, and the document is direct about what that means: NATO "could not mandate interoperability of national ISR systems, but that interoperability among national systems would be purely voluntary." Each nation decides for itself how far to go, weighing "the benefit of interoperability against the cost of compliance." This edition is Edition B, Version 1, promulgated 9 January 2018, and the Letter of Promulgation states it "supersedes AEDP-02, Volume I, Edition 1 which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of documents."

The interoperability target, and why it stops short of full automation

NATO defines four degrees of technical interoperability, from free-text human-readable exchange up to fully automated, semantically-understood sharing between systems. The NIIA's own objective is the second of these, "Degree 2: Structured Data Exchange", with "some specific interfaces achieving Degree 3". The document treats the higher degree, full seamless information sharing, as a long-term goal rather than an immediate target, and is explicit that reaching for it should not hold up what is achievable now: lower degrees "should not be delayed in favour of ultimately achieving a higher degree." For an organisation designing an interface into this architecture, that is a useful ceiling to know in advance - the bar most of the referenced standards are built to clear is structured, largely manual data exchange, not full machine understanding.

How ISR data is expected to move

The architecture assumes ISR data flows through five sequential steps: Task, Collect, Process, Exploit, Disseminate, referred to as TCPED. Requests are coordinated through a Collection Requirements List and a Collection Task List, approved at a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, before being tasked to the ISR assets that will actually collect against them. AEDP-02 sits alongside AJP-2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, which "provides the framework for coordinating and tasking JISR capabilities" - AEDP-02 supplies the technical means, AJP-2.7 the operational doctrine that drives when and why data moves. A system built to this architecture is expected to fit that tasking and dissemination chain, not just exchange data in isolation.

The architecture's building blocks

Three elements recur across the standards this document maps. First, a service-oriented network: producers "describe content using metadata, post metadata in catalogues for discovery, and exposes data and applications as services", while consumers "search metadata catalogues to find data services, analyse metadata search results found, and pull selected data based on metadata understanding," across six categories of core service - messaging, monitoring, data, registry, transformation and security. Second, layered metadata: the NATO Core Metadata Specification splits it into a security layer, a core element layer, and layers each Community of Interest defines for itself, with the NATO Metadata Registry and Repository holding the underlying XML schemas so implementations stay consistent. Third, geolocation discipline: position data is expected to carry "measures of uncertainty should accompany all geolocation metadata, such as information on random and systematic errors involved in location, pointing and timing measurements," and where that is missing, the resulting coordinates "should only be used for situational awareness" rather than anything more precise.

The standards it maps

Chapter 4 works through the STANAGs and Allied Publications that carry the actual technical requirements. The main groups:

  • Imagery and imagery libraries. STANAG 7023 for raw primary imagery, STANAG 4545 for processed secondary imagery, and STANAG 4559 for the ISR library interfaces that let systems search and retrieve stored products, implemented through AEDP-17 (static libraries), AEDP-18 (streaming) and AEDP-19 (workflow).
  • Motion imagery and radar products. STANAG 4609 for digital motion imagery, and STANAG 4607 for Ground Moving Target Indication radar data.
  • Data links and unmanned systems. STANAG 7085 for interoperable ISR data links, STANAG 4660 for a UAV command-and-control data link (detailed in AEP-77), and STANAG 4586 for UAV control station architecture (its message set defined in AEP-84).
  • Storage, tracking and biometrics. STANAG 4575 for advanced data storage interfaces (guidance in AEDP-06), STANAG 4676 for cross-source tracking data (associated with AEDP-12), and STANAG 4715 for biometric data interchange and watchlisting (specified in AEDP-15).
  • Tactical data links and messaging. STANAG 5516 and STANAG 5522 (Link 16 and Link 22), STANAG 5525 for the Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model, and STANAG 7149 / APP-11 for the NATO message catalogue.
  • Doctrine it sits under. AJP-2.7 for JISR doctrine, AJP-2 for intelligence and security doctrine generally, and AJP-3 for the capstone doctrine on NATO operations.

A handful of standards named in the text - among them STANAG 3377, STANAG 3596, STANAG 3920 and STANAG 4633 - are outside our catalogue and are named here plainly rather than linked. The document also flags two of the standards it maps, confidentiality label syntax (STANAG 4774) and a metadata binding mechanism (STANAG 4778 / ADatP-4778), as still in draft at the time of this edition.

What it does not cover

AEDP-02 Volume I stays at the technical view. It does not define the systems or operational configuration a specific exercise or mission actually uses, leaving that "to the people charged to create the specific operational networks based on the resources available from the Nations." It also does not resolve security and data-sharing policy questions that "can still hinder the dissemination and retrieval of ISR data throughout the combat theatre" even once the technical interfaces work - those are handled "at the senior national levels", not in this document. And while it mentions that fielded implementations go through "the test and certification of the implementations to verify interoperability and compliance with the standards," it does not describe that procedure itself: that sits in the companion AEDP-02 Volume II, along with configuration management and terms and definitions.

Getting the document

NATO publishes AEDP-02 through the NATO Standardization Document Database at no charge. ComplyTrain does not sell it or host a copy; the NSDD listing for AEDP-02 is the source.

How we help

AEDP-02 Volume I is a framework document: it explains why its family of STANAGs and AEDPs exists and how the pieces connect, but the testable requirements - the data formats, interfaces and message sets - live in those referenced documents, not in this one. Where ComplyTrain's work sits is alongside that reading: a controlled place to hold the design record of which interoperability degree and which specific STANAGs and profiles a programme selected, the configuration record of what was actually built, and the training and competency records for the engineers who built it - the kind of evidence a national test-and-certification review, of the sort AEDP-02 Volume II describes, would expect to see kept consistently rather than reconstructed after the fact.

What ComplyTrain does not do: it does not define, test or certify ISR system interoperability, does not choose which STANAG or profile a programme should implement, and does not stand in for the national or NATO process that actually verifies a fielded system against these standards. That work happens on the systems themselves.

Which of the standards this architecture maps actually apply to a given programme is set by the contract and the customer's quality clause, not by this page. See the standards explorer for what sits alongside AEDP-02, and talk to us about the evidence trail behind an ISR interoperability programme.

Standards it references

Questions

Is AEDP-02 mandatory for a supplier?

No. Nations record their agreement to use AEDP-02 through STANREC 4777, a recommendation rather than a ratified STANAG, and the document itself says interoperability among national systems is voluntary. It reaches a supplier only when a national programme or a contract specifies one of the individual STANAGs the architecture maps.

What is the difference between AEDP-02 and the STANAGs it lists?

AEDP-02 is the architecture description: it explains how the standards fit together and what interoperability degree they aim for. Each STANAG it names, such as STANAG 4559 or STANAG 4609, carries the actual technical requirement - the data format, message set or interface - that a system implements.

Does AEDP-02 Volume I cover testing and certification?

Only in passing. It notes that implementations go through test and certification to verify interoperability and compliance with the standards, but the procedure itself is described in the companion AEDP-02 Volume II, not in Volume I.

What edition of AEDP-02 is current?

Edition B, Version 1, promulgated 9 January 2018. It is effective on receipt and supersedes AEDP-02 Volume I, Edition 1.

Can ComplyTrain get a company certified against AEDP-02?

No such certification exists. AEDP-02 names no accredited or notified body and describes no scheme for certifying a company or a product against it; it is an architecture description that points to other standards, not a certifiable standard itself.