What it is
STANAG 4358 is the NATO Standardization Agreement on the mutual acceptance of government vehicle test and evaluation. Edition 1, promulgated in August 1991, under NATO's CNAD, AC/225 NAAG, LCGLE committee. Its purpose is to let one NATO nation accept another nation's official test and evaluation results for a government vehicle offered for acquisition, so states do not repeat testing already done.
NATO has not released STANAG 4358 publicly. This page describes it from a public national implementation, the Czech defence standard ČOS 999901 (2nd edition, amendment 1, 2024), which states that it introduces STANAG 4358 edition 1 into Czech use. A national implementation can add national requirements and reservations, so treat what follows as the Czech implementation's content, not as NATO's own text.
What the Czech implementation covers
ČOS 999901 sets out the procedures, timeframes and conditions under which the Czech test and evaluation authority must carry out vehicle testing and evaluation on request from another NATO state or organisation. It distinguishes two categories of government vehicle: those where development is starting or under way, and those where development is complete. Its stated purpose is to prevent duplicate testing: participating states will not repeat tests where results from another state's official test programme are already available.
Any vehicle a state offers for acquisition by another NATO state must come with a package of test and evaluation (T+E) data describing the test conditions, measurements, instruments used, results and which requirements were met. For a vehicle still in development, the offering state invites every considering state to join the T+E programme from the outset or as soon as practicable; a state that declines is instead given the T+E information it needs, consistent with the offering state's laws, policy and proprietary rights. For a vehicle whose development is complete, the offering state makes its agreed T+E data available in a suitable form. Where a considering state judges the data insufficient, the two states agree what supplementary tests are needed and how costs, planning and evaluation criteria are apportioned before testing starts. A request for an unplanned test follows the form in the standard's Annex C, and a disagreement over the acceptability of T+E work, or over interpreting or applying the standard, is referred to the National Directors for Test and Evaluation named in Annex B. The Czech implementation also carries the agreement's own directory of national test and evaluation centres and directors across NATO, listing the Vojenský technický ústav at Vyškov as the Czech centre.
Data protection under the agreement
ČOS 999901 also sets out how information exchanged under the standard, directly between governments or passed on to industry, must be protected. Classified technical data passes through inter-governmental channels and is marked with a level of protection equivalent to what the supplying government asked for; a recipient will not pass the information to another government or party without the originator's consent, will protect it to the level specified, will respect any intellectual property in it such as patents, publication rights or trade secrets, and will use it only for the purpose it was given for. Information provided in confidence keeps its original marking, or an equivalent one, and participating governments investigate any loss or unauthorised disclosure and report their findings back to the country of origin.