AATMP-51 NATO RPAS airspace integration procedures

What it is

AATMP-51 is the NATO Allied Air Traffic Management Publication that sets out harmonized procedures for integrating military Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) into NATO and national airspace alongside manned aircraft. It is covered by STANAG 7234, the ratified agreement through which NATO nations commit to the procedures it contains - the publication is the technical content, and a nation's adoption of the STANAG is what gives it force. Edition A Version 1 was promulgated in September 2019, and the document does not state what it superseded.

Who it addresses

The publication applies to "the appropriate Alliance and Partner Nations who adopt them and NATO commands responsible for the operations of military RPAS programs" (clause 1.3). That makes it a national-authority and operator document, not a supplier-facing one: it speaks to the air traffic and airworthiness authorities of NATO and Partner Nations, and to the units and Pilot-in-Command actually flying RPAS. It covers "all NATO Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Class III airspace integration activities" and is meant to apply "within the airspace of participating NATO Member Nations and anywhere NATO conducts missions or operations world-wide" (clause 1.3), including international airspace, where NATO RPAS operate "similarly to manned military aircraft" and, as far as possible, in compliance with ICAO standards (clause 2.16).

Two things assumed before this document starts

AATMP-51 does not certify aircraft or qualify pilots; it assumes both have already happened. Clause 2.10 requires that "all aircraft, manned and unmanned, provided on behalf of NATO shall be certified as airworthy by a NATO recognized AW Authority," with the detailed requirements held in separate publications: STANAG 4671 for UAS Systems Airworthiness Requirements, STANAG 4702 for rotary-wing UAS, and STANAG 4703 for light UAS. Clause 2.12 requires the Pilot-in-Command to already hold a military rating, either as a manned-aircraft pilot or, where a nation allows it, an RPAS-qualified pilot trained under ATP-3.3.8.1. Nations keep sovereignty over both: "as with all aircraft, Nations retain sovereignty over the AW requirements and certification for unmanned aircraft" (clause 2.10).

What flying under it actually involves

Because RPAS are treated as state aircraft, they sit outside the Chicago Convention's scope, though national authorities still have to give "due regard for the safety of civil aviation" when regulating them (clause 2.3). Within that, RPAS are to be "treated as manned aircraft to the maximum extent possible" (clause 2.4): flight planning follows the aircraft's own airworthiness documentation and approved flight manual, separation from other traffic should match manned-aircraft minima, and pilots follow the same ATC communication procedures and phraseology, with a fallback to telephone contact if radio communications fail (clause 3.2, clause 3.5, clause 3.9).

RPAS-specific procedures cover what manned aircraft do not need. A Pilot-in-Command must be able to intervene in the flight at all times and predict the aircraft's automatic behaviour if the command and control link drops (clause 3.1). Multiple remote pilot stations may hand off control of one aircraft across a flight, but "in NATO operations each PIC shall only be controlling one aircraft at a time" (clause 3.7) - a restriction that could be lifted only once a nation has multiple-aircraft-control capability and specifies it in its RPAS Military Type Certificate. If the command and control link is lost, the Pilot-in-Command must notify ATC by an alternative means, attempt to restore the link, and declare an emergency if that fails, while the aircraft follows predictable, pre-loaded emergency routing (clause 3.10). Depending on the system, the transponder may automatically squawk 7600 in that condition; a dedicated ICAO lost-link code, 7400, had been agreed in principle but was not yet implemented at the time of writing.

Every RPAS needs an operable transponder that lets the Pilot-in-Command respond to ATC code changes (clause 3.11), and the command and control link and remote pilot stations need security against interference and unauthorised manipulation, encrypted "to the maximum extent possible" (clause 3.13). Frequency assignment runs through each state's own National Regulatory Authority, coordinated early because the application process is different for each one (clause 3.12). Airfields, approaches and diplomatic flight clearances all need pre-coordination and approval from the relevant national and NATO authorities before a flight (clause 3.3, clause 3.15, clause 3.16), and accident or incident investigations follow the separate procedures in STANAG 3531 (clause 3.19).

How it is overseen

There is no accreditation or certification scheme against AATMP-51 itself. Oversight runs through the normal air traffic control chain for each flight, and through each nation's own airworthiness and pilot-qualification regimes, rather than a periodic audit of this publication. Where the document coordinates anything centrally, it is through the Aviation Committee (AVC), which issues air traffic management procedures for RPAS operations on the basis of agreed Standard Operating Procedures (clause 2.6).

What it references

AATMP-51 is covered by STANAG 7234, which is what nations ratify to give the publication force. Its own airworthiness references sit in STANAG 4671 and the STANAG 4702 and STANAG 4703 airworthiness requirements for rotary-wing and light UAS, and its accident and incident procedures point to STANAG 3531. The document's own reference list also names the Chicago Convention, NATO's UAS and airworthiness policies, ATP-3.3.8.1 on training UAS operators, and an EASA technical opinion on civil UAS regulation, cited as background rather than as a normative requirement of this publication.

Standards it references

• ATP-3.3.8.1Background
• STANAG 3531Background
• STANAG 4671Background
• STANAG 4702Background
• STANAG 4703Background