AOP-07
AOP-07 data requirements for explosive material qualification
A nation's National Authority assessing an explosive material for Qualification under STANAG 4170, and the designer, manufacturer or importer that requests it
AOP-07 sets NATO's shared data requirements and tests for qualifying an explosive material for military use, and records how each participating nation runs its own qualification procedure under STANAG 4170.
- Edition
- 2
- Published
- 2003-06
- Evaluated by
- government-surveillance
What it is
AOP-07 is NATO's manual of data requirements and tests for qualifying explosive materials for military use. It supplements STANAG 4170, the ratified agreement setting out the qualification methodology and principles that participating nations agree to use; AOP-07 is the detail underneath it, adding "the specific requirements, techniques, and tests used by the participating nations to implement the STANAG". NATO's Letter of Promulgation is explicit that the manual "contains only factual information" and that changes to it "are not subject to the national ratification procedures" the way STANAG 4170 itself is: they are simply promulgated to the nations concerned on receipt. This is Edition 2, promulgated in June 2003. Chapters 1 to 9 are maintained by AC/310 Subgroup 1 (Explosive Materials), operating "under the aegis of the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD)", which since 1997 has also admitted non-aligned Partnership for Peace nations who wish to take part; the United States is the custodian nation responsible for publishing approved revisions and adding new national contributions to Chapter 10 as they arrive.
Assessment principles common to every nation
Chapters 5 to 7 set the framework every National Authority works within. Chapter 5 fixes how qualification data are recorded and issued: each explosive gets a formal Qualification report, whose content should generally follow Tables 1 to 3 of STANAG 4170 and let other participating countries accept the explosive "with minimal or no additional testing", and a formal Qualification Certificate issued by the National Authority under Annex B of STANAG 4170. A data sheet in the AOP-26 format is also prepared for every explosive a NATO country qualifies and forwarded to the custodian nation for the NATO Catalogue of Explosives. Chapter 7 then sets the data requirements common to each material class - primary explosives, booster explosives, high explosives, solid gun and rocket propellants, liquid propellants, and pyrotechnic compositions - and every participating nation accepts these as a minimum, though a nation may add its own tests and pass-fail criteria in its own Chapter 10 section.
Aging, and the step up to Final (or Type) Qualification
Chapter 8 sets protocols for tracking whether an explosive's properties change over time, beginning early in qualification testing and continuing until there is reasonable assurance no unanticipated aging problem exists; a National Authority may still grant Qualification before that study is complete. Qualification under this manual and STANAG 4170 is a judgement about the material itself, and the document is explicit that it "does not imply Final (or Type) Qualification for use in a specific hardware application". That later step, covered in Chapter 9, ties approval to a specific munition or item of hardware, is assessed against STANAG 4297 and AOP-15, and is "generally the final approval level" before an explosive can be used operationally by the military forces.
Chapter 10: a national procedure for every participating nation
The bulk of AOP-07 is Chapter 10, where each participating nation sets out its own qualification procedure, its own National Authority, and its own catalogue of test information sheets. Several nations - among them Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States - describe the whole process end to end: who submits a request, what data is required, who reviews it, and what gets issued. Others contribute no more than a heading marked "to be provided".
The general shape recurs across most of the fuller sections: a written request reaches the National Authority, commonly from the explosive's designer, though "the request could come from the manufacturer of the explosive, or even from the munition or munition-component designer" in several national procedures. The National Authority initiates or delegates testing, assesses the result against comparable materials with a proven safety record, and reaches a qualification status of qualified, not qualified, or qualified with restrictions, followed by a formal Qualification report and Certificate. What differs by nation is how that authority is organised and how far it looks outside its own borders. France and Italy each describe an explicit "recognition of the Qualification" route: where a foreign National Authority has already qualified an explosive under STANAG 4170, the national authority can recognise that qualification from the foreign certificate (and report, if needed) rather than repeat the whole procedure, though it commonly still asks for supporting data. Denmark and the Netherlands, by contrast, develop no new military explosives domestically; they procure explosives already built into a munition or weapon system, so approval of the explosive is folded into approval of that system's specification rather than run as a separate national qualification. Switzerland, a Partnership for Peace nation that has not ratified STANAG 4170, treats a STANAG cited in its own section as "pure literature reference" that "does not imply the acceptance of this STANAG without any restrictions", while still receiving and assessing qualification data from other nations. The United States has no single National Qualification Authority at all: each Service - Army, Navy including the Marine Corps, and Air Force - qualifies explosives separately for its own use, coordinated by a DoD authority that "does not Qualify explosive materials or issue qualification documents", against MIL-STD-1751A, described as "the U.S. implementing document for STANAG 4170".
Who issues what
AOP-07 creates no certification, for an explosive or for a company. Qualification, the Qualification report and the Qualification Certificate are all issued by a nation's National Authority to the explosive material itself, following the authority's own review of the test data, and NATO administers no accreditation or certification scheme behind any of them. It is a national government assessment of a material, not an audit of an organisation, so there is nothing in AOP-07 for a supplier to be certified against.
Standards it references
- STANAG 4170 - the ratified agreement AOP-07 supplements, setting the qualification methodology and the Table 1 to 3 report format this manual's data requirements sit under.
- AOP-15, assessed through STANAG 4297 - the guidance and testing basis for Final (or Type) Qualification once an explosive moves toward use in a specific munition.
- AOP-26 - the NATO Catalogue of Explosives, the destination for the data sheet a National Authority prepares on every explosive it qualifies.
- STANAG 4123 - the hazard classification methodology a National Authority applies to an explosive material, required before qualification proceeds in at least one national procedure.
- STANAG 4439 and AOP-39 - NATO's Insensitive Munitions policy and guidance, which some national procedures test an explosive against alongside ordinary qualification.
- A recurring set of test-method STANAGs - among them STANAG 4147, STANAG 4443, STANAG 4487 to STANAG 4491, STANAG 4506, STANAG 4507, STANAG 4515, STANAG 4525, STANAG 4540 and STANAG 4556 - supply the actual test data behind AOP-07's material-class requirements, repeated across nearly every national section.
- A group of propellant stability test STANAGs currently cited as binding alternatives - STANAG 4117, 4527, 4541 and 4542 - which the document states will be replaced by AOP-48 and its covering document, STANAG 4620.
- MIL-STD-1751A and MIL-STD-2105B - the United States' own implementing documents for STANAG 4170 qualification and Final (Type) Qualification testing, outside the NATO catalogue.
NATO's Standardization Document Database is the authoritative source for AOP-07. NATO's documents are free of charge; we credit NATO for the catalogue and neither sell nor host a copy ourselves.
How we help
The work AOP-07 describes - a written qualification request, the test data behind each material-class requirement, an aging record, and the technical specification that follows a successful qualification - happens in laboratory and engineering work decided by a National Authority, not in software. Assembling and holding that evidence trail is a document-control problem: the request and its supporting data, the qualification report and certificate once issued, and, where several parties ratify a technical specification, a record of who signed off on what.
ComplyTrain gives a programme team a controlled place to hold that trail: the qualification request and its correspondence with the National Authority, the test records and aging data behind each material-class requirement, and the ratified technical specification and its revisions. That is the same document-control and audit-trail discipline ComplyTrain supports for any technical standard's evidence, not a mapping to AOP-07's specific material-class requirements.
What ComplyTrain does not do: it does not run a qualification test, assess an explosive's safety and suitability, or decide whether a material is qualified, not qualified, or qualified with restrictions. Those judgements belong to the National Authority alone. Which of AOP-07's requirements a given programme faces, and which nation's procedure governs it, is set by the contract and the customer's quality clause, not by us. See what else sits alongside AOP-07 in the standards explorer, and talk to us about the documentation trail behind an explosive material qualification.
Standards it references
- STANAG 4123Binds
- STANAG 4147Binds
- STANAG 4297Background
- AOP-15Background
- STANAG 4397Background
- AOP-26Background
- STANAG 4439Background
- AOP-39Background
- STANAG 4515Background
- STANAG 4491Background
- STANAG 4490Background
- STANAG 4489Background
- STANAG 4487Background
- STANAG 4284Background
- STANAG 4540Background
- STANAG 4443Background
- STANAG 4488Background
- STANAG 4506Background
- STANAG 4507Background
- STANAG 4525Background
- AOP-48Background
- STANAG 4620Background
- STANAG 4556Background
- STANAG 4582Background
- STANAG 4240Background
- STANAG 4241Background
- STANAG 4375Background
- STANAG 4382Background
- STANAG 4396Background
- STANAG 4496Background
- STANAG 4115Background
- STANAG 4479Background
- STANAG 4526Background
- STANAG 4581Background
Questions
Is AOP-07 mandatory?
AOP-07 does not bind on its own account: NATO's Letter of Promulgation states it "contains only factual information" and that changes to it are not subject to national ratification. It supplements STANAG 4170, the agreement nations actually ratify, so whether AOP-07's specific data requirements apply to a given qualification depends on that nation's own implementation of STANAG 4170, not on AOP-07 in isolation.
Does AOP-07 certify an explosive or a company?
No. Qualification, the Qualification report and the Qualification Certificate are issued by a nation's National Authority to the explosive material itself, not to a company or its management system. NATO administers no accreditation scheme behind any of them, so there is nothing in AOP-07 for a supplier to be certified against.
What is the difference between Qualification and Final (or Type) Qualification?
Qualification, under Chapters 5 to 8, is an assessment of the explosive material itself. It "does not imply Final (or Type) Qualification for use in a specific hardware application" - that later step, covered in Chapter 9 and assessed against STANAG 4297 and AOP-15, ties approval to a particular munition and is "generally the final approval level" before operational use.
Does one nation accept another nation's qualification of an explosive?
It varies by nation. France and Italy both describe an explicit "recognition of the Qualification" route, accepting a foreign National Authority's certificate (and report, if needed) rather than repeating the whole procedure, though each commonly asks for supporting data as well. Romania, Switzerland and the United Kingdom say their National Authority can receive and assess test data from other nations, the United Kingdom for munitions purchased overseas.
Why do some nations in AOP-07 develop no explosives of their own?
Denmark and the Netherlands both state they develop no new military explosives domestically. Each procures explosives already built into a munition or weapon system from elsewhere, so the explosive's approval is folded into approval of that system's specification rather than run as a standalone national qualification under AOP-07.
